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Eminent Domain-Benefits Conferred Upon
Property by Public Use
Equipped with the elastic yardstick of "just compensation"' the
judiciary has sought to measure the reward due the individual when
he bows to the exercise of the sovereign's power of eminent domain.
Cases involving only minor problems of the condemnation field
have exhibited a wide range of theories and decisions. One such
problem is presented when the taking and subsequent use of part
of a tract of land results in a benefit to the remainder. The various
definitions of just compensation in this situation -will be briefly
discussed in this comment. Throughout the article, it will be as-
sumed that the benefit to the landowner is reasonably ascertainable
and not merely speculative.
The diversity of standards applied when benefits are conferred
by an action of eminent domain is the result of the conflicting views
of the factors involved. The first of these factors, the benefit or
advantage, has often been divided into two classes. Based on a
geographical distinction, the benefits are termed either general or
special. 2 Typical definitions follow the line that general benefits
are such as are enjoyed by all people in the community; special
benefits are such as are peculiar to one or more persons by reason of
the more favorable location of their land with relation to the public
project.3 The definitions are vague at best and the results of their
applications to similar facts are far from uniform. Where the
benefit is the so-called "neighborhood" type, shared by lands in the
same area, vicinity, or project, the cases are in conflict. Some courts
view the benefit as general,4 others as special.5 One line of cases has
refused to attempt any precise definition, preferring to build up
examples by case decisions. 6 The principal argument used to sup-
port the division of benefits into general and special has been that
it is unfair to charge the condemnee for benefits which the owners
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of land not taken enjoy without charge.7
Some jurisdictions have made an increase in market value the
sole test and have said that any factor that increases the market
value may be considered in determining the compensation.8 This
rule would necessarily include benefits that in other states would
be both general and special, where they affect the market value. As
a result, the rule has been attacked as a violation of the due process
and just compensation requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.:'
In lauman v. Ross,' a District of Columbia statute providing
for deduction of increased value was held to be valid under the Fifth
Amendment. The court said that there was no express or implied
prohibition against considering benefits in estimating just compen-
sation and that Congress could direct subtraction of "... any special
and direct benefits, capable of present estimation and reasonable
computation.. .", In a case involving damage by an elevated rail-
way to an abutting owner, the court found the rule valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment :'
The fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment is that the owner shall not be deprived of the
market value of his property under a rule of law which
makes it impossible for him to obtain just compensation.
There is no guarantee that he shall derive a positive pecuni-
ary advantage from a public work whenever a neighbor does.
It is almost universally held that in arriving at the amount
of damage to property not taken allowance should be made
for peculiar and individual benefits conferred upon it--com-
pensation to the owner in that form is permissible. And we
are unable to say that he suffers deprivation of any funda-
mental right when a state goes one step further and permits
consideration of actual benefits - enhancement in market
value-flowing from a public work, although all in the
neighborhood receive like advantages. In such case the
owner really loses nothing which he had before; and it may
be said with reason, there has been no real injury.1 3
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Determination of the landowner's benefit does not present the
only complexity, however. The owner's injury must also be con-
sidered and for the purpose of deducting benefits this injury may
be separated into its component parts. These are the actual taking
of part of the land, damages to the remainder from the act of sev-
erance itself and damages from public use of the condemned por-
tion. It is generally agreed that the owner should be compensated
for damage from all these sources'5 but there is no general rule for
the deduction of benefits from them.16 It has been held that there
can be no deduction of benefits. 7 Some states have refused to allow
the set off of benefits against the value of the land actually taken.'8
These two views generally assume that just compensation implies
compensation in money rather than benefits. 9 Strangely enough,
this assumption is not always followed with regard to the injury to
the remaining land. It is sometimes said that just compensation
for the damage from severance or from public use of the portion
taken is measured by the excess of harms over benefits and that to
determine whether there has been any compensable damage re-
quires a deduction of benefits.20 A United States Supreme Court
case held that the requirement of just compensation for both the
land taken and damage to the remainder was satisfied by benefits
to the remaining land.2 1 The court said, ". . . when part only of a
parcel of land is taken . ., the value of that part is not the sole
measure of the compensation or damages to be paid to the owner;
but the incidental injury or benefit to the part not taken is also to
be considered. ' 22
The distinctions drawn within the two factors, benefit and in-
jury, have been variously combined. One noted writer has grouped
the combinations used into five main classifications :23
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1. Benefits cannot be considered at all.
2. Special benefits may be set off against damages to the re-
mainder but not against the value of the part taken.
3. Benefits, whether general or special, may be set off only
against the damages to the remainder.
4. Special benefits may be set off against both damages to the
remainder and the value of the part taken.
5. Both special and general benefits may be set off against
damages to the remainder and the value of the part taken.
The various states have given all these rules constitutional, statu-
tory or judicial support.24
Approached from the view of the landowner, all five of the
above-mentioned rules are valid under the Constitution of the
United States. The elements of the one most harsh to the landowner
-deduction of general and special benefits from both the value of
the land taken and the damage to the remainder-have been up-
held.' - If just compensation is viewed as a minimum requirement
and not as a rule of damages,20 the methods restricting deduction
of benefits and thus allowing the owner greater recovery are within
the constitutional requirement. The opposing interest of the con-
demning party is seldom considered. However, one court has said
in dictum that to award a landowner less than just compensation
would be unjust to him; ". . to award him more would be unjust
to the public."2 7 And a recent case hinted that state legislation
seeking to impose an obligation on the Federal Government for
greater compensation than that required by the Fifth Amendment
would be unconstitutional.28 Usually the question is raised by the
landowner and apparently the issue of a constitutional right of the
condemnor to a deduction of benefit has never been directly adju-
dicated.
The rules for the deduction of benefits complicate the conduct
of eminent domain cases and, as an original proposition, their use
might be questioned. Precise as such formulae may seem in the
vacuum of legal scholarship, the ultimate answer in jury cases is
influenced by all the variables of the jury's experience. A mention
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of benefits to the jury suggests the possibility for over-emphasis
and mental juggling. Conceivably the monetary awards to the
owner would not be greatly changed by defining just compensation
to the jury in these cases as the difference between the market
value of the entire tract before the taking and the remainder after
the taking. This would recognize the conditioning of the human
mind to think of property "value" in terms of market price and
effect a simplification in procedure.
It is highly improbable that the individual states will discard
their present law on the deduction of benefits, whether it be con-
stitutional, statutory or judicial. However, much of the condemna-
tion of the future will probably be brought in the district courts
by the United States or its agents. These cases do not require the
courts to follow the substantive rules of the state for the measure
of compensation 2' and the difference in market value could be estab-
lished as the definition of just compensation. The fairness to the
landowner and the public plus the existing precedent 0 would be
arguments for its adoption.
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